Sunday, April 7, 2013

Cognitive enhancing drugs - just because we can, should we?

In a discussion forum last month, leading bioethicists expressed support for the use of cognitive enhancing drugs. Researchers have claimed that drugs used to treat ADHD (Ritalin, Adderall) and narcolepsy (Provigil) are widely used in the healthy to improve focus and memory. Bennett Foddy, deputy director of the Institute for Science and Ethics at the University of Oxford, foresees many benefits of making cognitive enhancers acceptable in society. “So far as we can tell, cognitive enhancing drugs have a higher effect on people with lower intelligence,” said Foddy. “So it’s actually an equalizing force. Far from giving some people an unfair advantage, it’s a way of minimizing the unfair advantage which comes about because of differences in people’s genetic endowment” (qtd. in Chinthapalli). Another speaker claimed that there seems to be no moral problem with enhancing ourselves, since it is difficult to judge the boundary between therapy and enhancement in medicine. In regard to the issue of addiction, it was argued that the same problem comes up with many drugs—including alcohol—and that the “benefits outweigh the risks.” The speakers agreed that more studies on the effects of these drugs in healthy people should be performed (Chinthapalli).
But in this case, are the opinions of bioethicists reliable? First of all, the claim that cognitive enhancement is widespread may not be valid. The only evidence of common nonprescription use of Ritalin and Adderall by college students is surveys, which rarely ask specifically about the use of the drugs as enhancers. For instance, the 2009 National Survey of Drug Use and Health asked about the use of a stimulant “without a prescription of the individual's own or simply for the experience or feeling the drugs caused” (qtd. in Lucke et al.). However, students who report nonmedical use of these drugs could be using them to “get high” or to stay alert during late night parties. The same holds true for reported nonmedical use of stimulants in adults. While some adults may be using the drugs to enhance cognitive function at work, others could actually be using them to self-treat symptoms of ADHD (Lucke et al.). If cognitive enhancers aren’t as common as researchers believe, then attempts to facilitate the use of these drugs would be met with more hostility than anticipated. Secondly, the risk of addiction is of far greater importance than these researchers realize. A person taking Ritalin in acceptable doses and with medical supervision may not be likely to become addicted. But in large doses, stimulant drugs cause dependence and have a high potential for abuse.
If cognitive enhancing drugs miraculously improved brain function in healthy people, perhaps we could be willing to dismiss other concerns as secondary. After all, the prospect of reducing disparities in intelligence may seem attractive. But the extent to which enhancers improve cognitive functioning in people with neurological diseases and intellectual disorders is unclear (Lucke et al.). Moreover, recent scientific reviews draw attention to the limited evidence that stimulant drugs improve cognitive performance in healthy individuals. For instance, a recent study on the effects of Ritalin in healthy young men found increased activity in the region of the brain affecting attention. However, these findings did not correspond to “improved accuracy in working memory or visual attention tasks” (Lucke et al.). In addition, research showing the positive influence of cognitive enhancing drugs has important limitations. All evidence for the enhancing effect of Provigil, for example, is based on short-term trials in the laboratory (Lucke et al.). However, such results do not reflect on the practical benefits of long-term use of the drugs. No evidence exists to show that cognitive enhancers work over extended periods of time or in real-world situations. 
Everyone acknowledges that more research is needed to assess the benefits and harms of cognitive enhancing drugs in healthy people. But it is worth questioning whether these types of studies are even worth the investment. Contrary to media opinion, it seems unlikely that cognitive enhancers offer any true advantage for individuals and for society. The positive effects of these drugs over a long period of time in practical situations, if any, are probably minimal. Making stimulant drugs more accessible to healthy people would increase rates of substance abuse, offsetting any small advantage we might gain from enhancement. Bioethics researchers will have difficulty defending cognitive enhancers to a society that has also seen the effects of cocaine and the amphetamines. Not everything that is ethical is always acceptable. 

http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1743
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2011.611122#tabModule

1 comment:

Alyssa said...

You included this quote from Foddy: “So far as we can tell, cognitive enhancing drugs have a higher effect on people with lower intelligence. So it’s actually an equalizing force. Far from giving some people an unfair advantage, it’s a way of minimizing the unfair advantage which comes about because of differences in people’s genetic endowment” (qtd. in Chinthapalli).

This quote relates back to Sandel's "A Case Against Perfection." Sandel argues that we overemphasize achievement and under-emphasize genetic endowment in society because we are uncomfortable with the idea that some people are more genetically endowed and sometimes that matters more than effort. That is why, he says, Olympic coverage focuses on the struggles athletes have overcome, rather than talking only about their natural talent.

Sandel also argues for solidarity: sharing the genetic gifts we possess with others who were less fortunate in the genetic lottery. Along these lines, everyone would agree that all children deserve an education and can learn, no matter their genetic endowment. But we also recognize that Einstein probably had a higher genetic intelligence level than many other people, and if even if others worked 100 times harder than Einstein, they would not have had the same chances at producing the academic work that he did.

If cognitive enhancing drugs were to even this playing field as Foddy suggests, then supposedly everyone would be clustered around some area of intelligence. Foddy seems to think there is nothing to object to in this scenario, but he overlooks a a key point. Yes, cognitive enhancing drugs may have more of an effect on those with lower genetic endowments, but they still can aid everybody. As a result, this could thus easily turn into the kind of race Sandel describes in his paper. He talks about how if the really short use drugs to grow taller, then the average sized feel short so they take drugs and so on until no one is content with their size and everyone uses drugs.

With cognitive enhancement, those with lower intelligence may become "smarter," but then the smart will feel threatened and will take drugs too. Also, Foddy suggests that this will work out in the end because the drugs help those with low endowments more than they will help other people. However, he can't possibly know that those not as genetically gifted will have the same access, knowledge and desire to take these drugs as the more genetically endowed. If they do not, the smart people will be the only ones taking drugs, and the gap would widen rather than close. Foddy's point is only true if he can show that those with low endowments would definitely use the drugs just as much as those with many genetic gifts.

And, even if everyone had access to and took these drugs, is that really the kind of world we want to live in, where everyone feels the need to take drugs to enhance their cognitive abilities? Sandel asks the same question about height; do we really want to live in a world where everyone must take drugs to grow taller? That kind of world, of course, seems ridiculous.

http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2004/04/sandel.htm
http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1743