In bioethics, we
are always weighing the benefits against the risks, and we make our decision
from there. This case was no different. In September 2011, Dr. Ron Fouchier, a
virologist with the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, revealed findings of
an engineered strain of highly pathogenic avian flu. This sparked a debate
between researchers who insisted that it would help protect the world from a
serious pandemic threat and others who thought it posed a great danger to
mankind just by existing and should be destroyed. In January 2012, influenza
researchers around the world agreed to halt any work that could generate more
transmissible versions of the avian flu for sixty days. However, in May 2012, past
research that disclosed the methodology behind creating a deadly strain of bird
flu was published after months of debate surrounding the cause of medical
preparedness against the dangers of disclosing information that could
potentially help bioterrorists. A second paper was also published last year,
discussing the methodology of engineering a deadly H5N1 strain.
What originally
was a sixty-day pause became a yearlong suspension, but on January 23, 2013,
the forty researchers who signed on to the moratorium announced that their work
would resume in countries where governments have agreed to oversight and lab
safety measures. They state that it is important to resume work to prepare for
a potential bird flu pandemic and that the pause gave governments time to
review their biosafety and biosecurity policies and researchers time to explain
the public health benefits of the work.
The question at
the heart of this controversy is whether this strain could exist outside the
laboratory. Such testing has become more regulated and conducted in facilities
with specialized air filtration and airflow systems that require scientists to
work in sealed suits. Testing of this kind can now only be done in labs with a
biosafety level 3 (BSL-3), which has been enhanced and improved with more
personal protective equipment, the distribution of licensed H5N1 vaccines to
all lab workers, and a “buddy” system for workers.
Researchers
state that such mutations that were and are being engineered could just as
easily occur in nature. It seems better to know the capacity of such a virus
and to be able to plan for a possible pandemic than to feel threatened by the
hazards posed by carrying out such research in the first place. Safety concerns
are in the process of being addressed, and ways to conduct this dangerous
research safely are underway. There can never be zero risk, but there are
methods to minimize and manage the risk. A balance between the two sides must
be struck, and in this case, I believe it has. While great responsibility comes
with this task, in this case, ignorance is not bliss.
Sources:
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