Since 2003, there
have been 592 reported cases of avian influenza, or ‘bird flu’ worldwide. Of
those infected, 349 died from the disease, a 59% mortality rate. Regular
seasonal flu, by contrast, kills approximately 5,800 to 7,500 people each year
in the USA alone, from an unreported number of total cases. One of the reasons
that the total death toll from bird flu has been so low is that bird flu virus,
a member of the H5N1 class of influenza viruses, cannot easily spread from human
to human. Until now, that is.
Researcher teams
led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, have mutated the
H5N1 virus to be more easily transferrable between ferrets, which are
considered a good analog for human disease transmission. Ferrets infected with
either of the mutated strains were found to spread the virus to other ferrets,
and Fouchier’s team reported a 100% mortality rate from their mutant virus. The
research has sparked an international debate over the ethical issues of
researching infectious diseases. On January 20, 2012, Fouchier, Kawaoka, and 37
others called for a 60-day freeze on further research on mutant flu strains
until the international community could come to a consensus on the benefits and
risks of conducting and, more importantly, publishing such research.
Those who support
publishing a redacted version of the research, like Paul Keim, acting chair of
the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, argue that publishing
the full details of the methods used to make the virulent strains would create
a threat of bioterrorism on an unprecedented scale. While we do have vaccines
and anti-viral medications, our current supply and production capacity are not
nearly sufficient to handle a global pandemic – natural or engineered.
Furthermore, researchers have discovered wild virus strains that are resistant
to our current antiviral drugs. Those strains could be combined with the more
infective strains created by Fouchier and Kawaoka to create an even more potent
killer.
In a statement
advocating that the research be published in full, the World Health
Organization argued that redacting the research would be ineffective at helping
others build on the results found by Fouchier and Kawaoka. The WHO argued
further that distributing the full research to some scientists on a need to
know basis would be logistically impossible. Citing the “substantial immediate
risk” of bird flu, the WHO called on Nature
and Science to publish the papers in
full.
I believe that the
WHO made the right decision. Publication is an important principle of science,
without which progress is stunted. But more importantly, redacting or simply
not publishing the research would not necessarily reduce the risk of bioterrorism.
A determined hostile group could certainly acquire the know-how and equipment
to develop the mutant strains created by Fouchier and Kawaoka, whether or not
the research is published.
The advantage of
publishing the research is that we will be better prepared to combat such a
pathogen, engineered or natural, if it ever appears. As Kawaoka argues, it is “irresponsible”
not to probe deeper into the methods by which such viruses become infectious.
Especially given the extreme interconnectedness of the modern world, the threat
of a pandemic cannot be ignored. We must acquire a better understanding of the
nature of these viruses before the next outbreak. The risk of publishing is
simply not greater than the risk of keeping the results private.
Sources:
“The risks and
benefits of publishing mutant flu studies” Nature, http://www.nature.com/news/the-risks-and-benefits-of-publishing-mutant-flu-studies-1.10138
“Cumulative number
of confirmed human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2012”
World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/EN_GIP_20120305CumulativeNumberH5N1cases.pdf
“Estimates of
Deaths Associated with Seasonal Influenza --- United States, 1976—2007” Centers
for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5933a1.htm
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