Moral Status and Embryos

I remember that a certain classmate of mine mentioned that even though embryos are members of the human species, they deserve no moral status. Curious. This raised multiple questions in my mind. For example, what is different about embryos from fully developed human beings? Does this mean that human beings have no inherent value? From where, then, is moral status derived?

The only answer that I have encountered to solve this problem was Peter Singer’s. He states that self-awareness ought to be the standard by which the value of beings are judged, for only those who are self-aware can suffer, and only those who can suffer may hold personal interests. Yet this idea does not seem to make much sense to me either. To argue that personal interests are the standard by which moral status is derived from is to say that there exists a moral hierarchy, in which beings ought to be treated based upon what kind of interests they happen to have, rather than who or what they are. This would vary not only among different individuals, but also at different times. The very nature of moral status is at odds with this argument. Moral status is not something that is dependent upon circumstance – rather, it is the presence of a certain trait that makes one deserving of respect, acknowledgment, and equal treatment, among many other things, due to one’s ability to be a moral being. Thus, because an embryo is a member of the human species (albeit underdeveloped) and has the capacity to make moral judgments (George), it ought to be treated the same as one would treat a fully developed human being, for both have the same moral status.

Of course, Singer’s argument may not be the same used by those who would argue against the existence of moral status among the embryo population. Therefore, it is here that I lay the gauntlet down, in the hope that the issue of moral status among embryos may be further discussed and clarified.